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"For next year 1n Jerusalem."
on every JewLah holiday,

Those words have a place

In every Jewish religIous

ob:servance, and are even spoken In every Jewish prayer.

In

the Soviet Union as In other countries, the Holy Land forms
a true ba.sh fOl; the Jewll1h faith.

But perhaps In the

Soviet Union, MFor neKt year In Jerusalem- La spoken with
MOte anticipation than elsewhere In the world.
the Jews of the U.S.S.R. have been leaving their

Since 196',
ho~eland

to return to what they consider to be their real home--the
state of Israel.

Pe"klnq first

In 1979 with 51,000 Jews

e=lqratlnq. and then with a tremendous surge In 1990 of

over 200,000 e=lqratlnq, there eKlsts what one can only
term an exodus of the Jewish people from the Soviet Union.
ThIs exodus, fot seveu,l teasons, Is beneficIal fot the
three major parties Involved: the Soviet UnIon, whIch Is
findinq a new way to look at those of the Jewish faith even
while bestowing upon them the freedom to leave Its
confines;

the Soviet-Jewl:sh emiqrants, who now have the

freedom to seek for whatever reasons a different way of
life than they have known;

and the state of l:sulel. a

nation founded upon the idea of betoll.!nq a homeland and
safe haven fot Jews around the world.
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Plitt I:

Development

the Jewish Katlonal Consciousness

Certainly the rise of the Jewish national consciousness
is a pIvotal issue when one considers an exodus of such
magnitude.

I

I

I

Deter.lnaeian of

~nd

There are many factors to be considered when

tracIng thIs rise throuqh history.
~JewLsh

The ascendancy of a

Identity· appears to be very much dependent on the

treatment or, rather, the
separllte ethnic geeup.

~istleatment

of the Jews as a

And the cultural background and

ethnic identity which kept II nation of people cemented

\

I

I
I

together when they were, In effect, homeless Is very much

enhanced when they actually acquire II land of thelt own.
ay tracing the formative factors--includlnq governmental
leq151atlon, "ocial organi%atlon, and out"ide
considetatlon,,--to the pre"ent, one may plot the
developMent of a Jewi"h natlonal con"clou"ne"" and con"ider
Lts im.pUcatlon".

I
I
Throughout practlcally the entlre cour"e of hl"tory,
the Jews have been con"tantly harried and maUgned.

In

1127, following a precedent set flrst in fourteenth century
England, then in France, and then In Spain in the sixteenth
century, the Ru""ian "tate expelled the Jewish people.

The

~-~-

~-~--
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eauses ranged fro. the sinqular threat they posed to a
growing Russian

Christianity.
Russian and
As

~tlonal

consciousness to the growth of

Th1s event set the stage for centurIes of

Sovl~

anti-SemitIsm.

the Muscovite state eVOlved Into the Ruaslan Emptre,

the perceived

tht~at

by the Jewish people to the

nationalist Identity eased somewhat.
back In the

coun~,

but the areas In which they were

allowed to setUe were restricted.
te[ll'

~P"le

To",y were permitted

of the Jewl!:!h

Under

Settlelllent~

CathetlrH~

II, the

was first used.

It

4eflned the .re.s In which the Jews could dweLL freely.

Under SUbsequent rulers, the ·Pale of the Jewish
Settle.ent- contLacted or expanded to fit the particular
need of the day.

~lexander

I issued the most restricted

decree, statin." t::l:lat all Je.... lIlust Live in urban areas
within the bounda%ies of the old "Pale.Towards the end of the Imperial reqlme, the controls

I
I
I

r
r

placed upon the Jews became much harsher.

Under Alexander

II and Alexander III they were the subject of a ."roup of
measures known as the Kay La.....

These requlations aqain

II.ited the possible settle....nts of the Je.... to town$ and
yllla."e$ wIthin the ·Pale·; they restrIcted Je.... fro.
conductlnq busInes$ on Sunday$ and ChrIstian holidays; and
they outlIned a quota $y$te. for Jewish entrance to
secondary schools and universities.

The quota syste. was

set up because Jewish students ·were 'quick in joinin." the
ranks o"f the revolutlonary workers. '."-

After years of

•
repression, the May Laws elicited some lnterestlng
["spons"" .

The fIrst reply to the constant [epresslon
eminently logical one:

a

~a"

tn" Jewtl fled the country.

~5t

In the

lattet half of the nineteenth century, thell! Wete
approKlmately four million Jews Ln the RussIan €mplre. 2
r.estet Eckman, founder of he Juo:1alc Resell[ch Inlltltute,

"stlmat"s that by 1915 fully two mill Lon Jews had
ellllgrated. 3

Although frel! emigration was "trictly

forbidden, any Jew wishing to .ave west would almost
certainly be granted an eXlt vis•.
The second [espons" was somewhat more complicated and
was not exactly

11~ltl!d

to the Russian Jews.

Thls wa" thl!

development of various social movements, the one of
paul.QUnt importance being that of 21on15ll1.

J .S.

Seheehtman, a leadlnq member of the Jewish Aqency and the
\oIorld J"wish Conqress, points out that the f1rst meetlnq of
HovflvfI!

Zion

(Lovers of Zion) occurred In 1664, thirteen

years before the first Zionist conference In Basel.·
Zlonlsll' had sOme of Its deepest roots In Ru""la.

Thus,

Indeed,

as Schechtman aqaln not"", the majorlty of the forty
settle_nts that existed In PalestLne before World war I
were of Russian orI91n.The formative tenets of Zlonlslll were quite simple:

the

Jews should have a national homeland once ,,-qaln; their
homeland should be where the ancient state of Israel was;
and eventually the world's population of Jews would live In
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,
"that nation.

There we.t" sevetaL factions within the

Zionist movement, but by and large thes" basic belIefs were
constant.

The fact that a large pottion of the Jews in Russia
wanted to form a separate nation did not seem to overly
alarm the government;

howev""

the effect of Zionism on

the ordinary Russian was extreme.

Zionism to the everyday

Ivan on the stleet was regarded as an insidious plot by the

Jews, already the source of all problems, to take Over the
world.

The first step--the militant organization of the

Jewlsh people--was already underway.

The .tumors did much

to Cause social unease and were often extreme enough to
cause .tlotlng and vicious pogroms. c

Zionism, the most important responsive socIal movement,
was still only one movement.

Some of the JeW$ took a very

opposite viewpoint and turned to a socIalist or Russian
natlonallst Jewry as an answer to the represslon by the
TSiUS.

These Jews, the most prominent of which formed a

politIcal party known as the Farelnlkte, were to play an
instrumental part In the overthrow of the Tsarlst regIme.
They still believed there was hope for a viable Jewish
faIth in the RussIan EmpIre, and all that was requIred to
make that hope a reaiity was the soclal and polItical
change found In revolution.
with a massive wave of continuing emigration, and a
social situatIon fIlled wIth ZIonist or natIonalist
organizations, the Russlan Empire headed lnto the First

,
World War and

.I

revolution WhIch ,,",'lId chillnqe the poll tical

atmosphere of the natIon forever.

With the overthrow of

NIcholas II and the toppllnq of the ProvL$lonal Oove"tnlllent,

Vladl.er Lenin, leader of the Soviets, brouqht his Ideas
and 1d,,,0109Y to the Russian Jewish scene.

LenIn

WIth Lenin's advent to power, the Jews appeared to be
in a better posLrlon th ..n ever before.

Lenin cl ... ll'I",d that

he was a leader for the oppressed--and WhO was .ore
opprea:sed than the Jews?

II'" advocated e"luallty to all

people, and he promised them a new kind of freedom.

In his

own poLitical party there were several pro.ln",nt Jews.

In

fact, anti-Semites tended to equate communism with the
feared Jewish world consplu.cy. ~ and If the entire

comaunlst

-ove~nt ~ould

be mistaken as

~

~ompletely

occurrence, surely this boded well for the Jews.

Jewish

The

facts, however, fall" to bear out this conclusIon.
Even thouqh Karl Karx was a Jew, he was bltrerly
anti-Semltic.-

LenIn usually followed Karx's teachlnqs.

He was not opposed to
needs, thouqh.

In the

be

for

~ntl-Semttic

choose to be

~hanqlnq
~ase

of the Jews, Lentn

praq~tt~

~nti-semttic

those teachings to suit his
~ould

not afford to

reasons, and he did not

for philosophical reasons.

One

of the puc:tlcal reasons was thet a qood part of the
Co~unist

Party wes compoaed of Jews, usually those RussIan

,
natlonallst" exemplified by the me"'bets of the Facelnlktt:.
A second WliS thlle he needed and wanted a unHle:d Soviet

nation, and overt anti-Semitism was dIametrically opposed
to unification.

Philosophically, the idea of anti-Selllitism

was, to Lenin, II qreat hindrance to the equality he "ought.
Although Lenin apPolled antl-Selllltls111, his position "liS

a bit mote narrow than most people perceived.

Anti-Sellllt!"", was singling Out the Jew just because he was
a Jew.

1'hls, Lenin W"",, ",qalnst.

His feelings regardlnq

what actually went Into being a Jew was a different story
aLtoqether.

1'h" Jewl:5h cultural heritage was a hlndtllnce

to nat tOnal assllllilatlon, and thus all the Jewish schools
and ttadltlons "hould be done away with.
tolerated In a Communist country;
wonhlp had to d1e.

Religion was not

the Jewish ways of

Uonlsm, w1th Its dream of a totally

separate JeWIsh nation, was a definite hindrance to Soviet
assi~lli!ltion

and nationalization,

~nd

could not be

tOler.ted.
Under Lenin, 1..... were pa•• ed -.hing ZionIsm, and
indeed all Jewish polItical partIes, lilegeal.

Jew1sh

InstItutions were dismantled, synagogues closed, and their
posse•• ions u:propr1ated.

Everyone under eighteen ...s

prohibited £roJa receiving a re11gious education outside the
hOlle.

Ironically, IIlOst of these decrees were either

suggested or carried out by Jewish Communist,.
It can be argued that this was one
for the JewIsh national consciousness.

o~

the Lowest ebbs

The Jewish people

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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I

•
"'",re spLit Into two very anta90ntstlc faction,,:
Co.-unl"t" and the Zionists.

The

The unity <jlven to the JewIsh

people as they souqht to weather Tsarlst discrimination

,,"''''.eel

but a

~emory

now as hope took the JewIsh people In

two different directions.

The daMaqe done to the Jewish

IdentIty was all the mOre obvIous when One realizes that
Lenin, by <Jttacklnq the rellqlon aond the traditions of the

Jews.

W5S

attacking thos", very thIngs whIch had served as

their strength and chelt stay throuqh centuries of
persecution under the Tsars.

stalln

Under Stalin, the Soviet-Jewish national consciousness
made perhaps mOr'" solidifying 'lain" than under any other
leader.

During the first few yu',s. there was II continued

attack carrled out by the Jewlsh Communists on the existing
1lonist organizations.

Around 1'30, however, such

harassment dropped to ah,ost nothing.

A propaganda

ca.-palgn was launched Instead, Its purpose .erely to re.lnd
the non4Jewa of the evLls of tlonis •.

The official Party

llne wall that tlon1s. was dead,- but for sOme reason, the
propaganda campalgn aqalnst it continued.
W1th the outbreak of World War II, the party had to
take notice of 1ionis", once again.

With the annexation of

portionll of Poland, BeSllllrllbill, Northern Bukov1na, Latvia,
Estonia, and Lithuania the Soviet unton added well over two

4

,
mIllion Je_ to its populatIon.

Mote than that,

had not experienced the SovIet assault on
identity.

~e

these Jews

..lsh cultural

When the :zapildnlkl, the Westerners, came Into

contact With their culturally deprived nelqhboIs, they were
able to revive th.t Jewl$h spirit.

:ticl'll:l1. was induced

Into the SOViet-Jewish blOodstream like a
vacclne--tr.nsfDt~lnq

the ailing Jewish culture into

somethlnq that the Jews could again be proud of.

Stalin rude conllclous contributions ,HI well.

As a ploy

to gain worldwide support fot the Soviet cause, he
publlcally eased his stance on the Jewish situation.

~e

even sent Jewish envoys to plead for Zionist understanding
and sympathy for the Soviet war effort.

Ae

a rlarural

outgrowth of thIs strategy, StalIn had to declare hls
support for a Jewish state In Palestlne.

8y the U_e the

war was over, StalIn was touting a pro-JewIsh polIcy.
The SOViet Union now llned up to back the Jewish state
of Israel, and In 1948, :lust after the creatlon of the
state of Israel, the USSR rece1ved her fIrst Israeli
delegation, headed by Golda Hdr.

The outpouring of :loy

and the demonstrations held In her honor served
l~presslvely

to solidIfy the Sovlet Jews.

At the same time StalIn was pUblicly on the JewIsh
side, he was stIll executlng or exilIng II slgniflcant
portion of the hlghest ranking Jewish leaders.

As

soon as

Ks. Kelr left the Soviet Union, Stalin had any Jew who had
taken part In the deMOnstrations either locked up or

exiled.'"

Emigration to

l~rael

was barred; Schechtman

5tates that "from 15 Hay 1948, till the end of 1951, only
four old women and One disabled ex-serviceman "'ere
permitted to leave for Israei.""-"This peculIar type of hidden anti-Semitlsm contInued up
until StalIn's death.
"Ooctor's Plot," the

When the news was announced of the
~lx

beIng "Zionist sple".""-"

Je",s invoived were charged as
In the la"t years of hi" life,

Stailn had ailo",ed relations with Israel to cooi
considerably.

Ho",ever, no", that SovIet Jews knew that the

Jewish state exIsted, they seemed magnetically drawn
together In what can only be described as a national Jewish
identity.

The beginnings of the Je"'lsh national

consciousness was laid, fueled by Israel's exIstence but
with its roots far back in the days of the Tsars.

1953-1968

Under G. Halenkov, InterIm le"der of the Soviet state,
the grIpping waves of anti-Semitism ceased for a brief
whIle.

When N. Khrushchev, leader of the USSR untIL 1<;68,

took over, there "'as a slow but inexorabie return to
antI-Semitism.

Khrushchev seemed to share StalIn's polley

when it came to the Jewish question: publicly deny any
knowledge of anti-SemitIsm but In secret do as much to the
Jew as possible.

Eckman

propose~

that While

de-StalInlzation was a primary goal of Khrushchev's, he

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

11

still had to appease the Patty hard-liners who had approved

of stalin, and thus he did nothlnq to help the
Whether or not this was the casl!,

Jews.~~

It Is a fact that

Khrushchev was challenql!d openly several times about his
[,,£,,:oals ""en to let families be united In Israel, and he

always avoided thl!

IS5UI!.~4

During the "Thaw" after Stalin, Jewish national

consciousness surfaced, and the Jewish people werl!
obviously dls:satlsfll!d with life

In the Soviet Union.

Laurie Sallran, chait of the W. Averell Harriman
Institute'" Seminar on Soviet Republics and Reqional
Is"ues_ poInts out, that the typical Soviet Jew 5tl11
waited for do-e"tlc: [dorms up untll 1961-68, and It was
not "ntll the SovIet govI'!rnaent took a pro-Arab and

aot1-["t5ell stance In the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and
subsequently Invaded C:echoslovakia that the JewIsh people
began to reall:e that there was no hope for a peaceful
JewIsh exIstence In the Soviet

Unlon.~·

It was at thIs

tIme that the Soviet government began allowing emigration
of PolIsh Jews, and with the Poles as an example, the rest
of the Soviet JeW$ queued up to emigrate.

The first

contemporary wave of emIgratIon was on.

I
I
- - ~

..

I
I
I
i
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I
I
I
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I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

12

Part: II:

Eal<JI:atlon feOIa ;,. Soviet Standpoint;

Policy, ca.."..", and Effects

The period frolll 1968 untll U'.lO was characterized by

SOme dramatic changes In the Soviet government's attitude
to ..,,"rd the Jews.

A total of three distinct waves of

Soviet-Jewish emigration occurred, each with Its specific
causes.

The Fiest W.,ve

The first wave of eJalqratlon encolllpassed the period

ftOIll 1968 through 1914, beginning after a total embargo
that followed the Six-Day War.

In 1968, a totlll of only

229 Jews were permitted to e",lgrate;

grew to

2,9?9.~

in 1969, the number

Peillklnq In 1973 with 34,733, the number of

emigrants reached, comparatively, mas,," proportlons.There were several Soviet requirements for
participation Ln this first. WoJve:

one hoJd to be invit.ed by

a relative then llvlnq in Israel;

and one had to apply for

oJn exit vlaa, which ent.oJlled obtalninq a referral letter
f:o_ an e_ployer.

Aft.er these condltlons Were fllled,

e_iqration waa only aa far away oJ" 'l"overnmental approval of
the oJppllcat1on.

If the applicat10n were approved, then

oJll that WoJS left to do wa" to heoJd to vlenn", Or "ome
other connection point, and tr"nsfer to " plane he"ded for

13

tstael.
The official policy of the Soviet

qoYern~ent

allowed

..aiqu,tlon solely for the reunification of faailles, hence
the prerequisite of an invitation.

Soviet

the

at that tim" Ls SOMewhat difficult to

~tiYI!

discern.

In actuality,

Old the Soviets allow the Je .... to e ... lqrlllte

because of Jewish agltatlon1

Ot did the Soviets perMit

their departure because foreign policy made It desirable?
L,,',lfle P. Salltan develops the forDler theory, basically
statlnq that the Je .... were allowed to leave because of the

trOUble they

",",[l!

causLnq.

She proposes that the SavLer

government realized that by allowing II few of the mote
socially animated Jews to leave, social, economic, and

political benefits could accrue.

The government theorized,

In this scenario, that tht!!y would let a few of the
activists leave befoIt!! tht!!!r actions became an example to
otheIll, thus ridding theIDSt!!lves of a destabilizing
elelllent. 3

Salltan a150 points out that the first W<1lve

Includ.-d IIlollny elderly and

Influ. elligrants,

and that they

represented the least economically valuable segment for the
Soviet Union.'

An econollic benefit occurred, therefore,

because costly pension funds could now be diverted to DOre
useful economiC concerns.
The second theory deals with forelqn polley.

Ourlnq

tht!! late sixties and early seventies, a desire for detente
with the United States was a very Important Soviet
priority.

Their pursuit of SALT I Is evidence of this

H

Interest, and Lta e"use ma.y partly lie in the Soviet fear

of Improved Slno-Amerlcan friendship.

In this theory,

known as the barometer thesLs, soviet neqotiators realized
that Increased

e~19ratlon

was conducive to II relaxed

International atmosphere.

The barometer thesis also traces

Soviet-American relations through the periods of Jewish
and seeks to draw II direct relatLonship between

e~iqratIQn,

the two.

The wara.,r Soviet-American relations, the higher

the emigration totals,-

Certainly the argument Ls fairly

easy to substantiate with reference to emigration
statisticS and U.S.-SovLet trade, and for the most part It

Ieaalns apparently error-free.

The theory Is not, however,

entirely without fault.
Saittan,

~ddresslng

the barometer thesis directly,

points out sevetal na_ In lts basic assullptions.

She

asserts th,U given the perspective of time, it is unlikely
that emlqratlon would have

endu~ed

linked to u.s.

FOt example,

seve~al ye~tS

rel~tlons.

befote detente

if It had been

bec~me ~

dl~ectly

ellliq~ation

began

slqnlflcant factot.

Despite close sctutlny by the West, Jewish dissidents Wete
constantly

~nd

consistently

h~tassed.

Flnally, the Sovlet

attitude towatd Jewl.h cultutal and tellqious l1fe

~e

... ined

hatsh, and qrew even more hostile as exposure to the West
Increased.Whatever its causes, the first wave ended in 1973.
hlsto~ian,

writing during the period of the first wave,

states that the Soviet qovernment had three methods of

One

I
I
I
I
I
I
-I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I

~ .. Iqratlon:

discou, ..qlnq

propaganda,

ha~sm.. nt

-antl-ISlaeli and antl-ZLonlst

of those applying for ...I'Oratlon

visas, and repression In tile 'form of arre"ts and

trlals.·~

The propllqanda callie In two for=, anti-Semitic <lnd
anti-IsraelI.

The Soviet

qovetn~ent

began checklnq the

degree to which v15a applicants were related to the I"suers

of their invitations to Israel.
.. _~

.~

If the relationship was

'_edtat", famlly relationship, they would deny the

.."pllcant

oS

vLsa.

This

w",

e~trelllely

serious for the

refused applicant, because he or she had mote than likely
lost

<J

job when asking for the necessary referral Letters.

Thus was created a ,obless qroup of refuseniks.
government also began holding

oJ

The Soviet

serIes of show trIals,

apparently aimed at curbing the emigration of scientists
and engineers."

These measures had the l.medlate effect of

dropping emigration levels, but there was now an
undercurrent of domestLc tens Lon which would Inevltably
find an outlet.

The Second

w.. ..e

The second wave was the result of the internal tension
created by the ending of the first.
SovIet authoritIes believed that by

It is doubtfui whether
atte~pting

to release

only certaIn promInent actlvlsts that they would lnsplre
the rest of the Jew1sh population to do so.
15 eKactly what h<Jppened.

However, this

The hostile cU.ate created by

"
the Sovlet policy only

OU~ing

other Jews to leave.

Sovier JewLsh e_igration
substantial

numbe~,

In 1972-13.

to

~e~ved

in~pi~e

and

th~ough

the years 1975

around 14,000 a

ave~aged

but stl11 a

enco~raqe

d~op

yea~,

&

fro_ the over 30,000

However, by 1979, SovLet Jewish emigration had
emiqrant5.~

reached an all-time high of 51,320
The second wave was little

.o~e

than an outgrowth of

the first, although lt would co.e to dwarf its
in magnitude.
emlg~atlon

1977,

p~edecesso~

SovLet reaction to the threat of mass

in 1973 was to clamp down, usIng methods which

have already been

o~tlined.

The Lntenslfled

pressu~e

on

the Soviet Jews, ln their increasingly hostile environment,
served only to make them want to leave.
threat of joblessness and anti-Semitic
~p

Jews lined
g~ew

to emigrate.

n~mber

The

Even with the
ha~assment,

soviet

of visa applicants

steadl1y fro_ 1975 to 1979, and the Soviet

gove~n.ent

ulti.ately let the. leave.
Fi~st

and foremost, the Soviet government per_ltted the

emiqration because a

c~ackdown

popUlation,

not without

eltho~gh

not feasible.
spon50~ed

Second, the

antI-Se_ltle

on the entire Jewish
p~ecedent,

was decidedly

of the officially

~esult

p~opaganda

was an Increase In ethnIc

tensLons, and emLgration served in a small way to reduce
that tension.
significant

One addItional reason was that with a

po~tlon

of the Jewish

places in universities and other
oppo~tunitles

Jntell1gent~ja
1.po~tant

leaving,

job

were opening up, and a process of national

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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assimilation

co~ld

take

~Lac~

going to natIonal ellt ••.

wlth these vacant positions

~o

These openIngs Ln the educated elite, however, caused a
great deal of governmental concern. Taking steps to ensure

that the SovLet Union was not hurt by the mass emlgratLon
of the Jews, the KremlIn began denying Jews entrance to
unlversttLes Ln excess of the already strLngent quotas.

In

1968, one-thIrd of the Jewish populatIon was

unLverslty-educated, compared wlth only four percent of the
total popUlation.
was

ad~ltted

UnIversIty.

But, from 191' to 19'9, not one Jew

to the faculty of mathematLcs at Moscow State
From 1919 to 1980, only four Jews were a part

of the 400-S00 students annually

enrolled.~~

The

government was tryIn9 to Wean the country from the
extremely dense content of Jews In mental
labor

(um5t~venyll

DespIte thIs precautIon, SovIet

posltIons.~2

authorItIes once agaIn felt the need to clamp down on the
Jewish exodus.
EmIgration fell consIstently throughout IgeO, 50 that
by the end of that year only
e~Igrate.~2

21,~71

Jews were allowed to

This trend contInued through 1ge6, when only

gl4 Jews

e.lgrated.~4

advance

several arguments for thl5 second, and much mOre

severe, restrIctIon.

Proponents of the barometer thesis

The UnIted States had conslstently

denied the Host Favored NatIon trade status to the SovIet

I

Union since 1974.
went

al~at

FurtherMOre, the mass emigration of 1'7'

totally unnotIced by President Jimmy

Carter.~·

III
III
III
III
III
III
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This . . y have angered the Soviet leadership Into 4
hardening of theIr positIon.

TholQOs Haylor, Professor of

E:conomlcs and Business Administration at Duke Unlv<'!Islty,

comments that between

197~

and 1982 the Whole fabrIc of

detente came unraveled bec,,"use of Lssues such- as Angola,

Afghanistan, Poland, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Andrei
Sakharov, the Soviet natural-gas plpelLne to western

III
III
III

Europe, and last but not least, the

of the barometer thesis cIte this
it

at~

saM",

race.~·

Opponents

material and ask why

took until 1980 for such serious .atertal to have any

"ffl!ct.~·

Looking at the Intern"l tension thesh, one finds other

III
III
III

explanatLons for the drasUc drop In emigration durIng the

eighties.

Salltan points out that the scale of the mass

eXOdus could not be ignoted in the eighties, because it was
a tillle fot declinIng econolllIc and populatIon growth in the
Soviet Union.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Havlnq teallzed that f ....ily teunlflcatlon is

a never-ending process, the government had to act when 12.7
percent of the Jewish population had already

emiqrated.~.

Salltan also theorIzes that the Soviet tegime felt the need
to assett control OVet
as out of

is

ptoblem which It probably assessed

hand.~·

The ThJrd "'ave

The thIrd wave of Soviet Jewish elllIgtatlon began In 1987.
During that yeiSt, there was

is

definIte thaw in

I

I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

"
Sovlet-~erIC4n

relatIons.

In

Dece~et

of 1981, President

Ronald Reagan of the U.S. and Soviet leader MikhaIl
Gorbachev came together for a thIrd summit meeting.

Also

In oeceaber 1987, aore Soviet Jews were allowed to emigrate
than durIng any other month since

1981.~o

The

e~odus

had

begun.

There were several reasons to belIeve that the thaw in
SovIet ealqratlon policy 45 of 1987 was a temporary
meaSUre.

The Internal tension thesis would assert that

Gorbachev was basically trying to get rid of a small
portIon of hIs population which was jobless (as a result of
their visa applications) and lnherently worthless to the
Soviet economy.

AppeasJng

~estetn

nations clamoring for

tree ealqtatlon further reco..ended the idea, sO he very
wisely let the refusenIks emigrate.

I
I

Once they were gone,

he could aiways tighten the contrOls and keep home the more
valuable members of the Jewish community (the engineers and
sclentistsl.~~

This argument formed the basis for the

theory that Oorbaehev considered the emigration of the Jews
to be a temporary pheno.enon.

Salltan adds that the

restriction of emigration to one group could lead to
greater demands to emigrate on the side of other ethnic
minorities, a situation she Is sure Corbachev Wishes to
avold.2~

With her arguments In

~Ind,

one .ay conjecture

that Cor bache v originally intended this second wave of
Soviet JeW3 to be a temporary thing, and It Is because of
so.ethlng

a~ln

to the

baro~ter

thesIs that he cannot now

end the exodus.

Observing the growing number of emigres,

world opinion has grown too strong, and there are too many
advantages occurring as a result of the
Gorbachev to stop It now.

emigration for

Moreover, the emigration has

become secondary to a domestic reform that has risen out of
the emigration controversy.
There are many indicators of a loosening in the overall
Soviet domestic scene during the years 1987-1990.

Many of

these indicators deal specifiedly with Soviet Jewry.

On 7

December 1987, the Soviet gove:rnment disbanded its offiCial
"Anti-Zionist

As a sign of reduced ten"ion"

Commlttee."~~

on the lowest levels, ko"her food appeared in the official
state stores late in

And the growing number of

i987.~·

Jews permitted to emigrate "erves as an indicator of
domestic policy as well.

to. 1987, there we:re

8,1~5

total Jewl"h emigrant".

In

1988, th'He were 18,961 emigrants, followed by 71,142 In
1989 and over 200,000 in

1990.~~

Not only did the number

of emigrants keep growing, but the magnitude of domestic
polley kept pace.

In July 1988, a Soviet filmmaking team

attended the Jerusalem Film Festival, and for the first
time in history a Soviet government sanctioned films with
predominantly Jewish themes.

2 •

Later that same month, the

first Israeli delegation to the Soviet Union in twenty
years

arrlved.~~

In November of 1988, the Soviets, for the

first time since 1917, allowed Hebrew language classes to
be officially taught.

2

•

In February 1989, Jewish cultural

21

cente." were: legall:ted.

The fl.st opened In Hoscow that

same month, followed by Jewish cultural orqanizations in at
least a dozen clti." at the end of

19a9.~·

In OCtober

1990, the head of the antl-S" ..ltic q:roup PalJtyat,

In a court

case ·without precedent In the USSR," was tried and
convicted of sttu"lng up ethnic hlltred, and sentenced to a

two-year telm in ,all,sa
As one flnal

example of what lIlust be conside::ed the

greatest Iehabilitation of an ethnic qtOUP ever, there Ls
the subject of direct plane fl1qhts to Israel.

Since 1980,

Israel has aSked for direct flights fro .. the Soviet Union

to Is[ael to prevent the lo..s of Jewish elJtlqtants going to
places besides I5.&81 (the so-called drop-out phenomenon).
For years the Soviet

govern~ent

refused, saying that such

flights would constitute ·coercion,·"
~~igrants

should

hav~

and that the

the power of choice.

On 29

Septe~er

1990, the Soviet Union agreed to direct fliqhts to Israel,
s~rvinq

only to

exe~plify

how far Soviet-IsraelI relations

have come."
Despite the

re~rkable

number of positive indicators

occurring in the Soviet Union, there are still hints of ..
darker force,

re~inders

of a

ti~e

not yet -passed.

In late

1987, the KGB resorted to their time-honored tactic of
force to Quiet a qroup of Jewish protestors."

Even In

1990, anti-Semitism was a ma,or issue In the Soviet Union.
Early In February, the KGB Issued an appeal for calm to
counteract the rUmOrS and threats of pogroms aqainst the

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Jews.

AgaIn In July. Pravda contained an ,utlcle on how

H

.ntl-Se~it15.

eeonoale

threatened to under.lne the political and

tefor~

of the

CDuntty.~·

The fact that the

article was even written shows how far Soviet society has
co~e;

,..

but Its content underscores how far It still has to

The examples of what 1", in effect, the rehabilitation

of Jewish culture, point out how h,Hd it wiLL be to "hut
the now open door.

Free emigration Is taking place, and i t

is only a 519naL and a symbol of what may yet happen.

The

,,It.-te necessary for such emlqratlon as Is occurring is
danqerQusly two·£"ceted: the door lIIust be open, and the

leaders of the Soviet state lIIust dealre to keep i t open;
however, there lIIust be a reaSOn that so aany Jews want to
l."ve.

Be that all It l'lli!IY, one cannot help but 111010 the

posItive cultuc"l ceforms of which the Jewish e_lqratlon
hall been a catalyst, and believe thi!lt the Jewish Exodus has
been a positive occurrence in the SOViet Union.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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p~(t

Itt:

Th~

SGYi~t

Jewish

Em19~ant

While the mere fact of Jewish ethnic identity indicate.
certain accepted characteristics, a closet look at
lllalgI.tlon p"tteCl;ll points to an even IDOre exclusive set of
._lqrant-speclfic traits.

The l1Ioat important of these

Identifying components includes a general aqreement on
point of orig-ln, .,....:$on for lu,vinq, ... nd final destlnatlon.

Through the COUrse of modern Soviet Jewish emigration.

there has been a

de~lnlte

shift In emlgration compositlon,

especially with teqatd to these three categories.

Until 1974, emigration from the Soviet Union was
basically driven by religious reasonll.

Israel was

consldeted. the home of the Jewish people--thelr nation.
The Zionist background of the SovIet
st~ongest IltOtlvato~~ fo~
e.lg~ ... nt

where

ellllgr.tlng.

pool was made up of

Zlonl~1lI

~ews

~ews wa~

one of the

Natu~ally,

then, the

eOllllng fro .. tho.$e

a~e's

was the strongest, namely the regions annexed

by the Soviets In World Wat It and the outlying, lea.$t
n... tlonal1zed (Russlfledl areas such as Georgia and Central
A.sla.~

In these dIstrIcts, the

~ews

had been able to

resJst the natIonalization Which would have

th~eatened

their Jewish cultural Identity, ... nd therefore had a stronq

"
dll'l\rl! to ","lte wlth the state of Israel for truly Uonll1t
rea50ns.

Demographically, thl" pattern of the non-Sovietized Jew
15 d[.lUrie.

Ninety-eight percent of the pre-19H

emigrants went to

Israel.~

The bulk of this number came

from the Ie"" nationalized areas--thlrty five percent of
all Jews going to Israel caMe from

Geor91a.~

than 2.S percent of Sovlet Jews resided."

where less

The fact that

these early emigrants went to Israel, coupled with their
areaS of origination, certainly Indicates that they were
going primarily to fulfill their dream of being a part of a
Jewish nation, not -erely to escape the Soviet governaent
Or harsh economic conditions.

About their later

counterparts, the same cannot be said.

In 1974 a ma'or turning point

w~s

pattetn of Soviet Jewish emigration.

re~ched

In the

In thill yeat the

percentage of Soviet Jews who did not go to
ftom three percent to nineteen percent.-

Isr~el

'umped

Thill figure

continued to tlse, teachlnq fotty-nlne petCent In 1'376, and
staylnq at ovet fifty percent fot the remainder of the
lIecond wave,-

ThIs rapid upswlnq of "dropouts· wall

Indicative of s new type of emlqrant, one less concerned
with the Jewish state than with Individual safety and
welfare.

"
The yeal 1974 "'as l"deed the cru:< of the situation.

During tht,. year, an

e:<perl~ent

among the emigrating Soviet

meaSure the acceptance of

of 50rts was conducted

Je~,

an experiment designed to

~dropDut5.-

This exercise was

not planned in any way; i t just occurred.
however, were conclu'IIlve.

Its results,

The SovIet qovermaent refused to

Issue an exit visa ... Lth any other listed final destination
than

Israel.~

On the other hand, Soviet officials proved

quite willing to turn thelt heads Ln IlLenna If an eltigre

so.ehow boarded a plane to the United States.

With 1914',.

considerable fLnal tally of a nineteen-percent dropout
rate, Jews In the Soviet Union knew that there was an
alternative to the Israeli route.
Evll'n wIth such a route avaIlable, why would a per,.on
de,.lre to pick up his f.Jllllly and IIIOve to another countty,
leaving his old friends, occupatIon, and nationality
behind?
that

~The

Jerome Gilllllan, an emigration speclallst, states
second wave of Soviet-JeWish emigratIon In the

seventies was Il.Ore a response to· worsening conditions In
the SovIet Union than to an allure of any particular
Jllternatlve.~-

OILIlIl<In follo",," with a series of high

invectives agaInst the Soviet regime during the seventies,
characrerl:tinq the period as one of lost social dynamism,
led by aqed conservatIves who were "afraid of change,
afraId of new Ideas, engrossed In protectinq the status quo
and In rootIng out all opposltion,·-

He ralls that the

absence of considered and meaningfuL ,.oclal goal,. re,.ulted

in a society centered on individuai success, contrary to
the official ideology of the Soviet :>tate.

Such hypocrisy

led to the natural outgrowth of a corrupt and cynical
society.~o

On top of the increasingly unpleasant general social
scene, the Jews were victilMl of a vicious anti-Semitic
propaganda campaign.

This tactic has been discussed In an

earlier section, and without repeating details, one may say
that for many Jews, it left them with an increased desire
to leave the Soviet Union.
With such conclusions In mind, the results of a survey
of late seventies' emigrants may be examined wtthout
surprise.

~When

emigrants from this period were surveyed,

they cited discrimination on the basis of nationaLIty,
CUltural or political motivations, economic reasons, and
family reunification as Chief factors motivating their
decision to

emigrate."~~

These reasons, taken togeth",r,

Indicate the typical "new" emigrant of the second wave.
As the catalysts for

emigration changed, so did the

origins of the ",migrant pool.

OIith religious reasons much

less weighted, nationalization had very little effect on
the decision to emigrate.

What it did affect, however, was

the final destination of the emigrant.

Seventy-two percent

of all emigres from Russia and the Ukraine, very
assimilated areas, went to the United States.

On the other

hand, oniy six percent of the Georgians and thirteen
percent of the Central Asians went to the

U.S.1~

With the
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growing pefl:entaqe of elllLqrants qolng to the U.S.,

obvious that there was a remarkable SUIge In the
ellllqr",nts £rolll the ..s"llllilated areas.

Lt ls

nu~e[

of

The surge occucred

in these densely packed areaS because the'll" were the Jews

who felt

~"t

the dragging 50clal dynallllcs, who felt

~"t

the ",otl-5111111tlc propaganda call1paign, and who felt most the
lure of new opportunities.

They saw an avenue of escape lo

the emigration of their more religIous cultural cousins,

and they saw new possibilities In a route to AmerLca.

When the thIrd wave of emigration began in 1987, the
chief motivating factors for emigration remained fairly
constant with what they were in 1979--£ea[ of
dlscrllll1nation, fear of a worsenlnq econOIll¥. and a deslte
fot farally teuniflcatlon.

The rqjotity of Soviet Jewish

emlgtants Wete still co_ing to the U.S., and the majotlty
of those eralqtants otlglnated In the Uktalne and the
RussIan Republic.
Dlsctlralnatlon against the Jewish people 1n the late
eighties had sevetal new twists.

Fot ptob.1bly the flut

tl." In hlstoty, the Jews Wete the
because they Wete leaVing.

vlctl~

of antl-Se.itla.

WIth so Illuch concetn placed on

the human tiqhts Issue of Jewish eralqratlon, the entire
populatLon of the SovIet UnIon was well aware of exactly
who was le/lvinq their countty.

When emigration

"
restriction" for

ol",.."

eased In 1')117, 4 seed of [esentla"nt

beqilln to grow In the Iaind" of nationalla-c" throughout the
Soviet "rate.

'(evqeny Vellkhov. director of the Kutch.tov

InstItute of Atolalc Energy and melaber of the Central
Co_lttel!, states poLqnantly, "Sut if you want to talll
about emigration, why not put It In general terms--why

always, or m<llnly,

In tel:lII'5 of Jew,,?

have the right to leave the Soviet

Shouldn't everyone

Unlon?"~3

He goes on

to reveal another source of resentment stemm!nq

the

fto~

...l<;ratlon of the Jews, a probleJll known as "the brain

drain."

Because the Soviet "ysteJll provided frel! education

and professional trainIng, a

.l!~l!r

of that system wa,

expected to feel $o-e SOtt of obligation to i t .
when a Jew chose to

eml~rate,

Therefore,

espeelally a well-edueated

Jew, Lt appeared as If that Individual was

rene~ln~

on a

valid elalm to his manual and intelleetual resOurCeS.
Emiqration from thIs standpoint was siphoninq some of the
best minds out of the country, a problem, and the apparent
denial of obLlqation was causinq the build up of huqe waves
of resentment, another

problem.~·

To compound the Issue,

thIs resentment simply encouraqed other JeW$ to leave the
eountry.
The very real issue of

~the

brain

draIn~

can be seen by

lookinq at the occupations of Soviet Jews when they arrIve
In Israel.

Completely unskilled labor accounts for only

twelve percent of Israeli immiqrants. £nqlneers and
technicians make up thirty-eiqht percent of those

I
I
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"
\l/UIllqrants, ....hile twenty-one percent of the l_lqrant:; ace
In academics.

Eleven percent are In the medLc/ll field, and

the rest ace In market lng, admlnlstratlon, IIrt and sociaL
fields, lIervice positions, or otherwise skilled labor

e .. plo~ents.~· With such II concentrated nu-tl'H of educolted

people flowIng out of the country, the Soviets are not
imaqlninq -the brain drain- phenomenon.
In 1989, 10,000 Soviet Jews were /ll10w!!d to leave.
Only 12,000 of that number went to lUllel.'·

of the rest came to the

U.S.~~

The ma:\orlty

Also In 1989, President

Bush announced that the United States would no lonqer
consIder Soviet Jews as refuqees, and he set II ceiling for
total Sovlet I . .Lqration at 50,000.'·

Hade prl.arlly for

economic reasons, this announcement still came as a shock
for thousands of Jews wanting to emIgrate to the U.S.
rather than Israel.

Be that as i t mtty, the net Impact of

the new 1"""lgratlon [estrlctlon was to force the now
free-to-Ieave

e~lgrant

to go to Israel, as he was no longer

free to co_ to the U.S.

Israel's

_55

I.... igratlon was On.

Soviet Jews were still emigrating for better economic
conditions and because of antI-Semitism.
barely a consideration.

Zionism was

However, it seems that by forcing

the Soviet Jews to go to [srael, the U.S. also triggered
wave of Zionist feelings.

iI

These feelings were usually

_nlfested after a Soviet group arrived In Israel, but they
appeilred to be genuIne.

Groups of transplanted Russians

could be seen singing songs of

~Zlonls~~

Ln [ellqlous

30

meetings,

even though by their own admission they had no

deep religiou5 feeling upon their departure from the Soviet
Unlon.~9

After Bush closed the door on the SovIet JeW3, many of
them stlll held out for ad_lsslon to the u.s.

Over 30,000

applicants were on file at the u.S. embassy in Hoscow, with

another 30,000 on an Inforeal waiting list (Peat, The Hew
tork Timet, 3 September 1989, I, 1, 6).

would-be

~rlcans

These determined

saw (srael as overcrowded, dangerous,

and lacking In employment opportunities (more about

Israel's probleas In the neKt part I, but they still wanted
out of the Soviet union.

Soviet Jewish emigrants.

That

sentl~nt

was shared by all

I
I
I
I
I
I
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Part IV'

Israeli Absorption of the Soviet Jews

Israel Is II :state founded on lIl<lSS 1lllllllqratlon.

destiny of the state has been described as the
and "af .. hil"'en for Jews around the world.

M1

The

~ho..eland

When the lat'O"

influx of Soviet Jews beqan Ln 1966, the Israeli qovernlllent

rejoiced and welcomed the immigrants with open arms.
Twenty years later, with soviet Jews IIlUIl1gratlnq at record

rates, the Israelis have not changed.
The"e exists Ln a Israel a basic lIlytholo"lY,

Its origins

founded in a picture of the holocaust survivors being
carried ashore on the shoulders of the Jewish priesthood
whUe an Illegal IlnlEllq1:atlon fleet lies beached on the
coast of their anchnt hO_lllnd.

This set of belleh

accords that all Jewish t . . iqrsnts wl11 be welcomed, that
Isu.el I" the pl<tce of refuge for Jews, and th.. t [srael Is
their liIst, best hope.
From 1911 to 1990, almost four hundred thousand Soviet
Jews av.. lled thelll5elves of this last, best hope, and still
the state of Israel opened Its aras wid., encouraging and
at tlJaes even l ..plorlng the world's Jews to return once
/Igaln to the home that was agatn theirs.

The growth of the

""tlo" of Isr"el, however, WillS not without Itll growl"'l
palnll.

HousJnq

The ",ajor problelU with absorbing the Sovlet-Jewish

lmmlgrants had almost always centered around three
Issues--housing, employment, and the resettlement process.
Housing was an obvious lssue, as the number of people that
Israel can accommodate Is naturally limited by space.

The

government had been in the process of renting temporary
housing and constructing permanent dwellings since the
magnitude of the Sovlet-Jewlsh lnflux was first feit. The
simple truth was that it could not keep up.

Most

Immigrants were settled somewhere other than their first
choice because of space

conslderations,~

and with the

torrent of Immigrants In 1990, new arrivals were as oEten
as not bedded down In tent towns, transIt camps, or in
large refugee compounds consisting of tin, WOOd, and canvas
huts.

~

Contrary to popular thought, the housing shortage did
not force the Soviet Jews to settle In the occupied
territories.

Although housing was available there and such

housing was an alterna.tlve, a survey published In June of
1990 found only three thousand seven hundred Soviet Jews
living In the occupied territories, less than one percent
of Soviet-Jewish

Immlgrant~.·

employment

The second major Issue concerning the Soviet-Jewish
Immigrants was unemployment or, more descriptively,
unsuitable employment.

As already stated, the average

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

JJ

Soviet 1_lq[&n[ .... 5 "xtr" .... ly skilled,

Jl

Chal;Jlctl!rlselc

whIch became a proble.. when thosl! skills werl! nO longer

needed In the Israeli work force.

For I!xalllpll!,

Ln 1"0

Israel had three standing national symphony orchestras, •
number consLdered large even by the most liberal of music
lovers.

According to the Israeli Embassy, enough Soviet

muslct,HIS had Landed by the end of 1990 to form an

additIonal five complete symphony

oIche5t[as.~

Such an

Influx of talent would c,ntalnly bl! beneflclal for I5raeL
In the long run, but dealing ",lto the Skilled workers as

they arrived presented an eve[-qrowlnq problellt.

The proble. of employment was compounded not only by
thl! skill level of the SOViet-Jewish Illlllllqrants bllt abo by
their ag ... d ....oguphles.

For exalllple,

port Lon of the hr\llligrants,

In 1990 the largest

36 pereent, Wl!r'" ages 25 to 44,

the ag ... at whlch they ne ...ded employment,-

That statlstlc

translates to 66,024 new jobs "eeded In the country of
Israel in a sl"gle year.

Such jobs as street sweeping,

long con:>1dered as "Arab work," were very much In demand by
Soviet Jews with few

alternatives,~

The last _jor problela that Iuael had with the Soviet
Jews was in the process of resettlement,

Early

Sovlet-Jewlsh hUlllgrants caused a need for a speciflc
format for theLr llbllorptlon, and this need was Hlled by

the

qua~i-governmental

organizatIon known

a~

the

Jewi~h

Agency, which worked hand in hand with its true
govetnmental counterpatt, the
organization~

were

"'b~orption Mlnl~try.

re~pons1ble

These

for acqu1ring temporary

housing, the buIlding of permanent

home~,

the tecrultment

and training of absorption staff, hiring language

teacher~

and social workers, .,1"nn1ng "nd implementing training
cour~e~,

illnd dealIng with the acceptillnce of immigrillnt

student~

to

of the

I~rilleii

ab~orption

univet~itles.8

process, a

With the centralization
template for

~pecific

immigration from the Sovlet Union was laid.
A Soviet-Jewish immigrillnt to

I~rael

began his journey

wLth the plane flight to Israel, Which was until October
1990 a two-stillge affair.
ill

The first stage was typically on

Hungarian, RomanIan, Or Polish charter flight, and the

second on the national airline of Israel, El .1'.1.'

After

October 1990, direct flights to Israel from the Soviet
union were

allowed.~~

The air fare for all immigrants was

p.aid for by the Israeli government.

Upon arrival in

Israel, the immigrants were allowed one phone call each to
the Soviet Union at no cost.

The Lmmigrants were given

free taxi rides to their destinations.

Those with nowhere

to go were either lodged in hotels free of charge for two
weeks, or taken to an Absorption center where they could
stay until they found an apartment.

Before they left the

airport, they registered wIth the Absorption Ministry and
obtained an Ldentl.fication card bearing their photograph.

"
When they registered, they were gIven an "absorptIon
basket" containing a rights booklet, start-up money rangIng
frON 3250 for an IndivIdual to $3000 for a family,
depending on size, plus an additIonal $125 per person lor
l~dlate

needs.

During the first year In Israel, a

might be granted up to $15,000 In rent
~s

fa~Lly

stlpends.~1

of 1990, substantLal resentment over the start up

money and the tent stipends had Increased among some
IsraelLs.

A factor In this resentment was that landlords

were evicting older tenants to replace them with the
subsidized Sovlet

Rumors circulating about

Jews.~2

Immigrants demandIng specific jobs or living places were
also contributlng factors.
mlsunde~~tanding
we~e

There

of -otlvatlon.

doing the Soviet

a

Je~

e~tsted

The

favo~

hl~

way

by taking

th~ough

thought they

Is~aeli~

the Soviet Union, while the SOViet-Jewish
though he had fought

In Israel a

the~

away

immlg~ant

a vast

f~o~

felt as

bu~eauc~atlc

entity to achieve his end, an end which included
~elnfo~clng

this

the

fo~mulae

beleague~ed Jewi~h homeland.~~

. .y have been -ore

app~op~iate

1. . lg~ants of the seventies and eighties,
type of gap In

pe~ception

continued

Although

to the

su~ely

th~ough

the

sa~e

1990.

Absorption Successes

D~.

Theodore

studies at the

F~ledgut,

the

senio~

Heb~ew Unive~slty

Ln

lectu~e~

Je~usale~,

in
has

RU~51an

IClentl£leCl 1913 dS a ttJrnlnq point for the absorption of
Soviet Jews in ISIael.
there
ISI"el

_., •
'0

ACCQrCllng to FlleClgut, by this time

ease

",

tI"nsitlon perIoCl

on",olnq 'tom KIppur W" 0'
'"'
cohesive bonCl between
proCluce

Also,

•

0' Sovlet
'0< neWel

large, settle<l community

Jews

'"

Immigrants.

late 1913 helpeCl

. l l Israelis,

includIng

", USSR. •• " points "0' that
re-emi",ration late was one of the

newcomers from

from 1913

on, ISIael's

lowest In

the worlCl at five

pelcent.~~

".

Such an encouraqln", statistic

indicated that the absorption proc"ss did have its
successes.
A 1914 survey conducted on SovIet-Jewish immigrants
showeCl that while the social Ufe and the socIal status of
the immIgrants underwent very little net chan",e, thelr
stanClarCls of ltvlng had risen

stgnlflcantly.~·

With the

shattering Soviet economy of 1990, most of the
Soviet-Jewish immigrants could probably say that their
standard of living increased with the move to Israel as
well. The Immigrants of the seventies, el",hties, anCl 1990
were greeted in the same manner'

an unreserved welcome by

the government and the people as well,

Even the Israell

citizens dIscomforted by the mass of imml",rants 100keCl at
the situation wlth aplomb.

Said one such citizen, echolng

a phrase from the 1949 Ingathering of holocaust VIctims,
"The situation Is Impossible, but not

hopeless.H~'

There were ... and are ... advanta",es in the SOViet-Jewish
migration for the Israeli government as well.

The more

"
JeW'5 In [",r,sel, the II>OIe secure
the Middle East.

For

50~

<l

pLace that nation h." Ln

reason, the Jewish population

does not increase as East liS that of the Atabs.

In ,,/Illy

1990, Israel was 60 percent Jewish, but the Jewish

de..oqraphlc advanta'll! wLll end by the year 2020.

U

Every

plane load of Soviet Jews pushes that date back II lIttle
further.

Also, one of ["'<let's p<.lrpalle" Is to be a

tlomelllnd and hilven for all Jews. and every SovIet J .. w who
co.es to Israel

t~kl!s

the state one step closer to

fulf 111lnq I ts purpose.

Conclusion:

The Prolllise

It 15 estlllllllted by the 15raeI1 government that
Sovlet-Jewish
i~lgrants

Immiqt~tlon

wlll account for one milllon

In the yeats 1"1 to l"5. i

This total increases

Israel's population by 25 percent, and Is comparable to the
United States absorbing the natton of France.

The soviet

Union will be hard pressed to allow sO many of Its highly
trained and educated

eltl~ens

to depart, but the nat ton

will profit lIlOte froll the freedolll their departure h.. ralds
rhan ho... theIr presence within its boundarl ..s.

The

emIgrants are searching for new lives, and If they r ..turn
to Israel they will be well taken care of by those that
calle before the•.

And Israel?

Israel cOlles that llIuch

closer to gathering all of his children together.
that wlll undoubtedly present

proble~

Although

rIght now, th.. state

of Israel has met IDllny such problelftS In Its past and has
somehow prevailed over them all.
Ylt~hak Peret~

proble..

As

Absorption Minister

states, ·tn the short run. it's a great

tn the long run, it's II grellt promise.· ..
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Emigration from the U.S.S.R. since 1968
Table 1

Year

1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
Table 1.

ThoS8lO

VOM

the U.S_S.A.

,,,..

Jews woo left
the U.S.S.R.

229
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28864
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1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

21471
9447
2688
1314
896
1140
914
8155
18961
71142
200279

Jews wno lett

EmIgration from the USSR since 1968. CompIled
fro~ Goodman, 22 and Israeli Embassy, telephone
conversation.

• The obvious discrepancies In the InItial data reflect
the diffLculties Ln securlnq reliable data for tho5e
early years. The fIgure" given are the most relIable
for the IndivIdual cateqorles.
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